Through the just-completed pre-season tests, the MotoGP paddock has tackled the dual problems of switching from Bridgestone to Michelin tires, and of giving up their own written-for-the-job software in favor of a much less sophisticated, same-for-everybody software (No more rib eyes for you fat-cats! From now on it’s ham & cheese for everyone.). It has been commented that one of the capabilities no longer included is adaptability. In the past, team software has monitored measures of tire degradation (wheelspin, instances of sudden yaw) and has continuously re-scheduled throttle baselines to compensate. Supposedly the most riders can now do is to switch in alternative maps from handlebar-mounted switches, much as GP riders of 20 years ago did, or as street riders do today (Normal, Sport, and Rain modes). In effect, therefore, what the mandating of common software has done is to set the art back a number of years. We may compare this to Formula One’s practice of periodically banning specific downforce technologies, thereby keeping the teams perpetually at work in the wind tunnel, seeking the same result through new means. Naturally, it is easier for the well-funded teams to recover performance than it is for the tail-enders. In racing, any change, no matter its intended purpose, costs the teams money. The supposed reason for MotoGP’s common software is to deny the top teams some of the special tools that separated them from smaller makers such as Aprilia or from satellite/private teams. This, it may be supposed, will enhance competition by bringing the #1 and #24 lap times closer together. It might also be thought to lower the barrier to joining the series perceived by makers such as BMW, Hyosung, etc, thereby encouraging their participation. The obvious way to adapt to the new software would be to accept it on its own terms in each area of performance, as in “Okay, now we have to be satisfied with jerky anti-wheelie that does the “2008 lift-and-drop,” so that’s the best we can do.” On the other hand, all the factory teams maintain and continually refine proprietary simulation software over which DORNA have no control. Such software has been used by all air and ground vehicle manufacturers for many years to allow rapid review of huge numbers (as in millions) of alternatives, seeking those few combinations which deserve actual physical testing (which is expensive). It seems quite likely to me that a sophisticated team could use such simulation to work backward from the desired track performance (which is known in excruciating detail through the recording of data from every lap over many years) to discover how to best approximate that performance using DORNA’s ham & cheese software. The factories argue that MotoGP’s value to them lies in the opportunity to freely develop the motorcycle at the highest level, leading to technologies applicable to production. DORNA, in limiting this development, gamble that the factories want the SE Asian sales that MotoGP stimulates more than they need free development.Gadget Reviews: mamaktalk.com
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